Justridiction For Maintenance Marriage

The provisions of Sections 13 and 14 of the CPC deal with foreign court rulings and their implications. Any case that is thereby directly decided between the same parties, the parties under whose titles they claim to be litigating, or any of them, the foreign court judgments are conclusive. It is not against natural justice, wasn’t obtained via deception, and didn’t violate Indian law if it was issued by a competent court with authority, was based on the merits of the case, and wasn’t determined to be in accordance with international law on the face of the proceedings.

In Narasimha Rao v. Venkata Lakshmi [1991] 2 SCR 821, the Honourable Apex Court discussed section 13 of the CPC in great detail. The Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, USA issued the decree of dissolution of marriage after assuming jurisdiction over the husband’s local divorce petition on the grounds that the husband met the minimal residency requirement of having lived in Missouri for 90 days prior to the action’s commencement. Second, the order had been issued solely on the basis that there was no longer a reasonable chance that the parties’ marriage could be saved and that the marriage had, as a result, “irretrievably broken.” Third, the respondent wife had not consented to the foreign court’s jurisdiction.

The Court outlined the consequences of each Section 13 clause in Satya v. Teja. It is worth quoting from the judgement’s pertinent section:

In clause (a), “5. According to Section 13’s clause (a), a foreign judgement that hasn’t been rendered by a court with the necessary authority isn’t recognised. We believe that this paragraph should be construed to mean that only the court that is recognised by the Act or the law that governs the parties’ marriage as a court with the authority to hear the matrimonial dispute will be a court of competent jurisdiction. Unless both parties freely and fully submit themselves to the jurisdiction of that court, any other court shall be deemed to lack jurisdiction.

In the same way, Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act’s definition of “competent court” must be interpreted “

Clause (b): “16. Clause (b) of Section 13 states that if a foreign judgement has not been given on the merits of the case, the courts in this country will not recognise such judgement. This clause should be interpreted to mean (a) that the decision of the foreign court should be on a ground available under the law under which the parties are married, and (b) that the decision should be a result of the contest between the parties. The latter requirement is fulfilled only when the respondent is duly served and voluntarily and unconditionally submits himself/herself to the jurisdiction of the court and contests the claim, or agrees to the passing of the decree with or without 16 appearance. A mere filing of the reply to the claim under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or an appearance in the court either in person or through a representative for objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, should not be considered as a decision on the merits of the case. In this respect the general rules of acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the court which may be valid in other matters and areas should be ignored and deemed inappropriate”.

Clause (c): “17. The second part of clause (c) of Section 13 states that where the judgement is founded on a refusal to recognise the law of this country in cases in which such law is applicable, the judgement will not be recognised by the courts in this country. The marriages which take place in this country can only be under either the customary or the statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the one under which the parties are married, and no other law. When, therefore, a foreign judgement is founded on a jurisdiction or on a ground not recognised by such law, it is a judgement which is in defiance of the law. Hence, it is not conclusive of the matters adjudicated therein and, therefore, unenforceable in this country. For the same reason, such a judgement will also be unenforceable under clause (f) of Section 13, since such a judgement would obviously be in breach of the matrimonial law in force in this country.”

Clause (d): “18. Clause (d) of Section 13 which makes a foreign judgement unenforceable on the ground that the proceedings in which it is obtained are opposed to natural justice, states no more than an elementary principle on which any civilised system of justice rests. However, in matters concerning the family law such as the matrimonial disputes, this principle has to be extended to mean something more than mere compliance with the technical rules of procedure. If the rule of audi alteram partem has any meaning with 17 reference to the proceedings in a foreign court, for the purposes of the rule it should not be deemed sufficient that the respondent has been duly served with the process of the court. It is necessary to ascertain whether the respondent was in a position to present or represent himself/herself and contest effectively the said proceedings. This requirement should apply equally to the appellate proceedings if and when they are filed by either party. If the foreign court has not ascertained and ensured such effective contest by requiring the petitioner to make all necessary provisions for the respondent to defend including the costs of travel, residence and litigation where necessary, it should be held that the proceedings are in breach of the principles of natural justice. It is for this reason that we find that the rules of Private International! Law of some countries insist, even in commercial matters, that the action should be filed in the forum where the defendant is either domiciled or is habitually resident.” On the basis of the above interpretation, the Court then went on to lay down a golden rule that has been repeatedly followed and relied upon in subsequent cases: “20. The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The only three exceptions to this rule were also laid down by the Court itself as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; 18 (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.” Bringing in the benefit of certainty and predictability of law, the Court said that “the aforesaid rule with its stated exceptions has the merit of being just and equitable. It does no injustice to any of the parties. The parties do and ought to know their rights and obligations when they marry under a particular law. They cannot be heard to make a grievance about it later or allowed to bypass it by subterfuges as in the present case. The rule also has an advantage of rescuing the institution of marriage from the uncertain maze of the rules of the Private International Law of the different countries with regard to jurisdiction and merits based variously on domicile, nationality, residence permanent or temporary or ad hoc, forum, proper law etc. and ensuring certainty in the most vital field of national life and conformity with public policy.” According to the Court, the decree dissolving the marriage passed by the foreign court was without jurisdiction in this case as according to the HMA Act neither the marriage was celebrated nor the parties had last resided together nor the respondent resided within the jurisdiction of that court. The decree was also passed on a ground which was not available under the HMA Act which is applicable to the marriage. Further, the decree had been obtained by the husband by representing that he was the resident of the Missouri State when the record showed that he was only a “bird of passage”- He had, if at all, only technically satisfied the requirement of residence of 90 days with the only purpose of obtaining the divorce. The court reiterated that residence does not mean a temporary residence for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, but ‘habitual residence’ or residence which is intended to be permanent for future as well. The final judgement therefore was that since with regard to the jurisdiction of the forum as well as the ground on which the foreign 19 court had passed the decree in the case, were not in accordance with the Act under which the parties were married, and the respondent had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court or consented to its passing, it could not be recognised by the courts in this country and was unenforceable. The Court finally said: “We believe that the relevant provisions of Section 13 of the Code are capable of being interpreted to secure the required certainty in the sphere of this branch of law in conformity with public policy, justice, equity and good conscience, and the rules so evolved will protect the sanctity of the institution of marriage and the unity of family which are the cornerstones of our societal life.”